To say that interrogation serves an important purpose, however, is not to say that interrogation ought to be conducted by the police. The problem of coerced confessions presents a problem substantially different from the nonproblem of compelled testimony. Accordingly, I propose, as a corollary to the withdrawal of the constitutional privilege, a per se exclusionary rule for any statement obtained by the police from an arrested person. The Supreme Court could achieve this result by tightening the fourth, sixth, or fourteenth amendment limitations on police interrogation. Regrettably, the explicit command of the fifth amendment would remain fully applicable to federal agents. Any fair reading of that amendment's privilege against self-incrimination would require safeguards against invalid waivers equivalent to those available in related procedural contexts, a result that would reduce the government's ability to enforce certain federal laws. But, on the whole, the proposed regime would prevent abusive police tactics more effectively, would secure a larger quantity of probative evidence, and would foster a more principled and coherent body of law than any present alternative.
II. ARE VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS OBTAINABLE ON A SYSTEMIC BASIS?
A confession to the police is not admissible unless, as a due process matter, it is given voluntarily. According to the Court in Mincey v. Arizona, a confession is not voluntary unless it is the product of "a rational intellect and a free will." 1 If given after the police have taken the suspect into custody, a confession is not admissible unless the police administered Miranda warnings and obtained a "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. "' 12 Satisfaction of these standards is conceptually possible, but not on a general basis. The devout Christian may believe that God commands confession of an isolated criminal act; the sincere utilitarian may conclude that society as a whole will benefit from his punishment. But in the vast majority of cases, the confessor never achieves this sort of detached reflection; most confessions are anything but "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." By this I mean more than the true, but trivial, statement that confessions, like other phenomena, 11 437 U.S. at 398. 12 Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851, 853 (1987) . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ("If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.").
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See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 868-80 (1979)(discussing free will and confessions, concluding that on assumption that confessions are caused, test for admissibility should be whether reasonable person under similar pressure would confess).
14 Cf Weinreb, The Complete Idea ofJustice, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 752, (1984) . Professor Weinreb states:
In order for a person's unconstrained decision to count in the way that gives rise to moral responsibility, the decision must be made in a stable natural context. Without that, he would be like someone who wakes up in a room where there is a board of buttons to push and no indication of which button does what. He pushes a button at random, and outside the window a building blows up. He pushes another button and lilacs bloom on the flagpole. But when he pushes the second button again, the flagpole vanishes, leaving only the lilacs blooming in midair. Hard as he tries to discover a pattern, he cannot. He has a certain kind of freedom; it is up to him alone to decide which buttons to push, or whether to push any. But it is freedom in a funhouse, a nightmare in which nothing that one does can be depended on. Having stumbled on a benign situation outside the window, he resolves not to push any more buttons; but then the situation begins to change whether he pushes them or not.
Id. at 771-73 (footnotes omitted).
15 1 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2 (1986). 16 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (duress), § 3.01 (choice of evils-necessity), and § 4.01 (mental disease).
17 See 12 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1487, at 323 (H. Jager rev. ed. 1970)("It is undoubtedly true that wherever the circumstances are such as to warrant an action for deceit for inducing a person to enter into a contract, they will certainly warrant avoidance or recision of the bargain.")(footnote omitted); Frankel, From Private Rights Toward PublicJustice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 527-28 (1976) ("Recognizing that people imprudently err in far slighter matters [than confession] under far slighter pressure [than custodial interrogation], we now allow the targets of door-todoor salesmen a few days of tranquil reconsideration before holding them to the purchase of a vacuum cleaner.")(citing U.C.C. § 3.502); Sutherland, Crime and Confession, vance to confessions, which amount to de facto guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has refused to accept guilty pleas made without a complete understanding of the consequences and alternatives. 1 8 If positive law is evidence of positive morality, as I think it is, then our society refuses to recognize as voluntary those acts that result from personality traits or external circumstances outside the broad ambit of ordinary experience. We excuse the man who embezzles the ransom to save his kidnapped child because he is no more criminal than the rest of us. We also excuse the psychopath, whose disease, like the gangster's threat, establishes a cause for conduct external to the actor's personality.
If this is what voluntariness means, that the causes of the conduct in question are internal to the personality of a normal person, then few confessions indeed are voluntary. Most obviously, confessions are self-destructive. 19 We do not speak of criminals "voluntarily" leaving fingerprints at the scene of the crime or receiving undercover agents into confidence. We may hypothesize cases in which a dedicated moralist, upon detached reflection, elects to exercise autonomy in favor of confession. But can this be so in 79 HARV. L. REV. 21, 37 (1965) (circumstances of typical custodial interrogation would void any will under doctrine of undue influence).
18 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) . In Henderson, the Court invalidated a plea of guilty to second degree murder because the indictment charged first degree murder, and, in pleading to the lesser charge, the defendant was never apprised that the state could not prove second degree murder without proving an intent to kill. Under these circumstances, "the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process. '" Id. at 645 (citation omitted) . 19 See H. SILVING, ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 258-59 (1964) . Professor Silving states:
As there are special situations in which a "guilty plea" is advantageous to a defendant, so there are also instances in which it is rational for him to confess. But in the vast majority of cases a confession is highly damaging to him, even allowing for the fact that, notwithstanding affirmance to the contrary in law, a confession may result in mitigation of a sentence. In fact, in capital cases a confession is often a form of suicide. The Roman rhetorician Quintilianus pertinently observed that "such is the nature of confession that one who confesses may be regarded as insane." If we substitute for "every confession" the phrase "every confession in which no objective or otherwise rational advantage to the defendant can be shown to obtain" and for "insane" the term "neurotic," the proposition would be clearly valid today. Hans Gross implied this when saying as regards confessions other than those induced by objective advantage, by hallucinations or religious influences, that he "knew of no analogy in the inner nature of man, in which anybody with open eyes does himself exclusive harm without any contingent use being apparent." Clearly, in this type of case man confesses to satisfy some irrational inner need. Psychoanalysts explain the confession phenomenon as a product of a confession compulsion, overriding any rational desire for self preservation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
thousands of cases involving people who have never hitherto expressed any morality different from self-interest?
The psychological explanations for confessions suggest otherwise. Guilt and a desire to be punished, a desire to shift responsibility to others, and the need for love are the subconscious pressures impelling confessions. 20 Generally, these pressures operate unseen, but the few cases allowing access to the suspect's mental processes suggest that when a confession occurs a "free will and a rational intellect" are not at work.
In People v. Heirens, 2 1 for example, the police arrested a teenage burglary suspect. At the hospital to which he was taken, doctors, at the behest of the police, administered sodium pentathol. In the resulting confession, Heirens admitted his involvement, but ascribed primary responsibility to "George," a thoroughly wicked person under whose influence Heirens had selected apartments to be burglarized. "George" always frustrated Heirens' efforts to prevent the planned crimes. When asked for a description of "George," Heirens described himself exactly.
Standing alone, this might be interesting theory and an eerie case. The police tactics taught in interrogation manuals, however, appear to be effective precisely because they play upon such psychological pressures. 2 2 The interrogator sympathizes with the guilt-ridden suspect, suggesting that real responsibility lies with the victim, an accomplice, or the suspect's family. 23 The alienated, insecure suspect is flattered with compliments to his criminal prowess. 24 And, the most effective method of all, the notorious good cop/bad cop routine, clearly has the effect of stimulating the suspect's associated needs for love on the one hand and punishment on the other. 463, 465-67 (1975) . From the psychoanalytic perspective, the moral attitudes internalized during childhood demand reconciliation with authority. The suspect impelled by such attitudes desires both empathy (as a signal that authority has forgiven him) and punishment (because the subconcious mind associates punishment with the expiation of childhood offenses). 21 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954) . 22 See Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1968) ; Grano, supra note 8, at 672-75 (Whose police "tactics designed to increase the suspect's anxiety ... are intended to increase the pressure-the compulsion-on the suspect to confess.").
23 See, e.g Id. at 151-53. The authors believe that the good cop/bad cop routine is most effective when performed by a single interrogator. The psychoanalytic approach would predict the same conclusion; if a confession results from the associated needs for love Presumably, the manuals commend these strategies because of their general effectiveness, not because the psychological pressures they play upon are rare or unusual among those suspected of crime.
Those suspects who are neither vulnerable to psychological pressure nor inclined to abandon self-interest can still be baited to confess with police deception. 26 The suspect's rational fear is aggravated by heavy-handed threats and promises of future lenience or severity, which are, in turn, always conditioned by equally heavyhanded disclaimers that no promises are being made. The suspect's rational despair is exploited by the fabrication of extrinsic evidence.
The claims of prominent police spokespersons, that unless the police have a substantial period of unfettered control over the suspect for the purpose of employing these tactics suspects would choose not to confess, confirm the notion that most confessions are obtained in violation of the suspect's autonomy. 2 7 Very few people confess spontaneously; but, as one might expect from this discussion, such persons typically suffer from identifiable mental impairments. A leading police manual counsels that many are not guilty of the crimes they confess. 28 Indeed, a recent study of such cases describes those who confess spontaneously as "persons who have committed crimes [who] are compelled to confess and accept punishment." 29 Finally, granting the theoretical possibility of autonomous confessions, which cases fit into this category? The inaccessibility of the police tactics and the suspect's mental processes means that, despite the possibility of a truly voluntary confession, we lack the magic net to catch the unicorn.3 0 and punishment, the dispensing of love and punishment alternately from a single source would be comparatively more effective. A male/female team of interrogators might prove more effective still.
26 See Grano, supra note 8, at 668-70 (discussing deceptive tactics recommended by F. Taken together, these considerations suggest that judicial dicta about voluntariness are inapt descriptions of doctrines designed to restrain abusive police tactics without preventing the extraction of confessions. The old due process cases clearly had this flavor, 3 ' and the Court has taken the same approach this term in two cases decided under Miranda and the fifth amendment.
In Colorado v. Connelly, 3 2 the Court held that, absent police abuse, a person who is incompetent due to clinically identifiable insanity may voluntarily confess and knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights. Connelly, incompetent at the time due to untreated severe schizophrenia, walked up to an off duty uniformed policeman and confessed a homicide. The startled officer administered Miranda warnings. After the arrival of detectives, Connelly purported to waive his Miranda rights, made incriminating statements, and directed police to the scene of the killing.
The Colorado Supreme Court suppressed the evidence, reasoning that the initial statements to the off duty officer were involuntary and that the subsequent statements to the detectives, made after they had taken Connelly into custody, were obtained without an effective waiver under Miranda. 3 3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, for due process purposes, a confession is not involuntary without police misconduct and that waiver of Miranda rights is determined by a standard no stricter than the standard governing the voluntariness of a confession. 3 every confession case to date, it is also true that in every case the Court has made clear that ensuring that a confession is a product of free will is an independent concern." '37 Along the same lines as the decision in Connelly, in Colorado v. threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege."). More recently, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) , the Court reversed the exclusion of evidence obtained from a suspect who invoked the right to silence when questioned about the crime for which he was arrested but then made an incriminating statement several hours after the first interrogation terminated, in response to questions about another crime. The second interrogation was initiated after a fresh set of warnings. In holding that Miranda does not "create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the subject in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent [,] " the Court noted that to "permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned." 423 U.S. at 102-03 (footnote omitted). The test under Mosley is whether the suspect's "right to cut off questioning" is "scrupulously honored." 423 U.S. at 103 (quoting Miranda). This, of course, is inconsistent with the marathon incommunicado interrogation approved of in some voluntariness cases. Even more clearly inconsistent with the Connelly dictum is Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) , in which the court held that no fruit of interrogation is admissible if obtained after the suspect invokes the right to counsel, as opposed to the right to silence, unless counsel has conferred with the suspect in the meantime. To say that there is "obviously no reason" to scrutinize confessions more closely under Miranda than under the due process test ignores the failure of the voluntariness test to either prevent police abuse or protect individual autonomy in the majority of cases. See Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fith Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS ON LAW AND POLICY 41. If the fifth amendment applies to police interrogation, it seems far more "obvious" to apply the same standard for waiver that would be applied to any other proceeding. None of the Justices, I suspect, would consider valid a waiver of the privilege by one detained incommunicado for days before a grand jury or by a defendant at trial who takes the stand in response to perjured testimony orchestrated by the prosecution and recanted after the defendant is cross-examined. The only reason for applying a different standard during interrogation is to obtain evidence that the privilege is designed to shield. In my view, this approach is subversive of constitutionalism. Although I think the privilege is a serious mistake, the Justices have no commission to restrict its scope because they, too, think it is a mistake. At face value, this standard would require excluding almost every confession not spontaneously rendered by the perpetrator. Given that confession is, from the standpoint of self interest, irrational, that police manipulation is its "but for" cause, that the "mental abnormalities" impelling confessions are to be taken into account, what "person of ordinary firmness" "strongly preferring not to confess" would do so unless he found the "interrogation pressures overbearing"?
Responding to this concern, Professor Grano conceded that "police bent on obtaining a confession usually [ordinarily?] prevail," but he then denied that, under his formulation, "most confessions will have to be supressed. ' '43 He explained that the " 'person of ordinary firmness' test reflects a moral standard prescribing the effort and resistance that reasonably can be expected of suspects in custody." ' 4 4 " [T] he objective of the interrogation.., is to succeed," and, therefore, "due process principles only limit the means" toward that end. Like the Court before him, Professor Grano cares not at all for autonomy itself; he cares only about the methods by which autonomy is overborne. Like the Court before him, Professor Grano phrases the test in terms of what rational persons would choose under the circumstances and immediately admits that the test must mean something else if confessions are to be obtained. So it is not surprising that in a recent essay Professor Grano argues that personal autonomy, the legal relevance of which he ascribes to Escobedo and Miranda, is inconsistent with police interrogation as practiced and as it must be practiced if it is to succeed. 46 Grano, supra note 8. Professor Grano argues that police interrogation is inconsistent with the suspect's autonomous choice. I agree with this contention. Professor Grano claims further that obtaining evidence of crime is more important than honoring a suspect's autonomy, as long as police methods do not rise to an unspecified level of offensiveness. He admits that this judgment is inconsistent with Escobedo and Miranda and claims that for this reason those cases should be overruled. This, I believe, is only an argument against the privilege against self-incrimination, for it is also true that the obtaining of evidence is inconsistent with and more important than shielding the accused from relevant questions at trial. As long as the privilege applies, Miranda is subject to cogent criticism only for not going far enough to provide effective enforcement of fifth amendment rights. All attempts to exempt police interrogation from the privilege or to defend a lesser standard of waiver during interrogation are based on hostility to the very existence of the constitutional provision and, therefore, are unconvincing.
What we know about police interrogation and confessions strongly suggests that autonomous confessions are not obtainable on a general basis. This conclusion suggests the central question, one from which the confusion of autonomous choice with freedom from police cruelty has deflected analysis. That question is whether, and, if ever, when, compelling a confession is justifiable?
III. SHOULD WE HAVE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?
Treating the Constitution as a religious, rather than a political, text invites two easy errors. The first is to read into the Constitution's ambiguous provisions our own visions of political morality, thereby elevating legislative preferences to the unjustifiably exalted status of natural law. The parallel temptation is to treat the clear provisions of the Constitution as reflecting incontestable and holy moral judgments.
Anyone who has argued about the meaning of due process knows the former tendency. Whoever openly assails the privilege against self-incrimination quickly discovers something of the second. Even Jeremy Bentham, accustomed to unreflective resistance to argument and without the impediment of a venerated text, was astonished at the reverence otherwise thoughtful people held for the privilege. Bentham's argument against the privilege is simple: the privilege denies the court the best available evidence regarding the defendant's conduct with respect to the crime charged. But the great force of his passage on self-incrimination is not the positive argument for admitting the evidence; it is, rather, his thorough and devastating survey of the reasons for keeping it out.
There is, Bentham acknowledged, always "the old woman's reaSuch efforts are analagous to the claim that, because national security is inconsistent with and more important than the prohibition of prior restraint, the first amendment should be "interpreted" to allow prior restraint. 47 See 5J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229 (1827)("In the minds of some men.., if you set about proving the truth of a proposition, you rather weaken than strengthen their persuasion of it. Assume the truth of it, and ... you do more towards riveting them to it than you could do by direct assertion, supported by any [of] the clearest and strongest proofs."). Given the extensive reliance on Bentham that follows, I should point out that Bentham was more than a strong thinker and active reformer. He also helped to shape modern liberal criminal law and the law of evidence and, indeed, liberal democratic society in general. Wigmore wrote that " [r] emembering that in less than three generations nearly every reform which Bentham advocated for the law of evidence has come to pass, we might almost regard his condemnation of any rule as presumptively an index of its ultimate downfall." J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2250 , at 3092 (Ist ed. 1904 son" that "tis hard upon a man to be obliged to criminate himself." '48 This, we might note, is the Supreme Court's "cruel trilemma of self accusation, perjury or contempt." 4 9 Dean Griswold 50 and Professor Greenawalt 5 1 also have endorsed this argument. Yes, answered Bentham, "[h] ard it is upon a man ... to do anything that he does not like. ... What is no less hard upon him, is, that he should be punished: but did it ever yet occur ... to propose a general abolition of all punishment, with this hardship for a reason for it?"52 "Suppose, in both cases, conviction to be the result: does it matter to a man, would he give a pin to choose, whether it is out of his own mouth ... or out of another's?" 53 We might balk a little at this and insist that it is at least marginally more cruel to compel persons to convict themselves than to convict them with independent evidence. But is this marginal cruelty enough to justify foregoing the evidence? It is not enough to justify foregoing testimony of nonparty witnesses that incriminates loved ones or exposes personally ruinous but nonincriminating facts. By the same token, the marginal cruelty of questioning the accused in open court after the appointment of counsel does not seem great enough to justify abandoning such an important source of evidence.
Two related arguments link the privilege to the prevention of torture and similar abuses. Justice Frankfurter argued that the privilege "was aimed at ... a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber," 54 a greater evil than any loss of evidence. "The privilege against self-incrimination," he wrote, "is a specific provision of which it is peculiarly true that a 'page of history is worth a volume of logic.' 55 The privilege, injustice Frankfurter's view, had a historical justification and should be historically interpreted. Similarly, but with a more prospective emphasis, Wigmore, although deeply skeptical about the privilege's justification, 5 6 maintained that, without it, any system of justice would degenerate because of the invitation to take brutal and oppressive shortcuts. standing, the privilege is itself a prophylactic against abusive interrogation.
But the inconsistency of the existence of the privilege with abusive tactics does not establish that the privilege is necessary to prevent them. As Bentham pointed out, a question is not a thumbscrew. 58 By the same association of evil institutions with any of their practices, he wrote, it would do as well to forbid the judges to sit in a room with stars adorning the roof. 59 Many legal systems permit judicial examination of the accused and the drawing of adverse inferences from silence without appearing to tolerate more abusive interrogation than exists in the United States. 60 As a historical matter, torture in England declined prior to the legal recognition of the privilege. 6 1 This experience suggests that the privilege reflects, rather than causes, the legal determination to eradicate investigative brutality. If this is so, rules aimed directly at abusive questioning suffice as long as the political will exists to enforce them.
Absent that will, the coexistence of the privilege with the legitimated desire to obtain the evidence has done a great deal to en- 41-42 (1969) . Under the Continental system, the suspect is not, and indeed may not be, sworn as a witness and, thus, subjected to perjury. Nor may any sanction other than the drawing of adverse inferences be applied to silence. If questioning brings suspicion to bear upon a witness, as opposed to the accused, the witness may demand to be charged with an offense. The system is therefore not as different from our own as sometimes supposed, but, in both theory and practice, it brings to bear much greater pressure on the accused to give evidence than is brought in an American trial. courage abusive police tactics. Precisely because the privilege bars humane interrogation under legal supervision, subterranean interrogation has known tolerance and even encouragement.
62 Miranda's critics never go so far as to claim that the police have legal power to compel the suspect to answer. 6 3 Yet implicit in criticisms 62 According to the Wickersham Commission: The constitutional privilege that no man shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case, often is a serious obstacle to the detection of crime. There is much evidence that despite this constitutional declaration, and because of the obstacles thus presented, confessions of guilt frequently are extorted by the police from prisoners by means of cruel treatment, colloquially known as the third degree. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 3 (1931) REV. 239, 278 (1946) ("Abstention from third degree abuse will still depend on the ability of the police to protect society without resort to them.")(footnote omitted). I do not claim that in the absence of the privilege abusive police interrogation would disappear. Indeed, "as regards possible police station abuses, the continent on the whole is no better and no worse off than we are." G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE GRIFFITHS, supra note 60, at 20. But, I do claim that in the absence of the privilege effective controls on police interrogation would become politically feasible. The exclusion at trial of any statement obtained by police, whether for impeachment purposes or otherwise, would leave only the investigative utility of admissions as a rational incentive for police interrogation. Irrational incentives, such as mere sadism, racism, or the like, must be coped with through civil or criminal prosecution and administrative discipline. But given an effective substitute for police extracted confessions and a refusal by the judiciary to admit such evidence, offensive police tactics would surely diminish significantly. See Kauper, supra, at 1242-44. 63 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964)(White, J., dissenting) ("Cases in this court, to say the least, have never placed a premium on ignorance of constitutional rights. If an accused is told he must answer and does not know better, it would be very doubtful that the resulting admissions could be used against him."). Recent attacks on Miranda similarly refuse to endorse police power to compel incriminating answers. See Inbau, Over-Reaction-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982) ; Caplan, supra note 3, at 1445-58. Both articles condemn the advising of the suspect of the right to remain silent and both condemn the offering of a lawyer to the suspect because a lawyer may induce the suspect to exercise the right to silence. Neither article urges abolishing the right to silence in the face of police questioning nor denies its existence in positive law. This, surely, is an untenable position; the privilege cannot be both good and bad with respect to a single defendant in a single prosecution.
of Miranda is the judgment that the police ought to have this power, or at least ought to appear to have it, because the courts do not, and society needs it. This anti-constitutional attitude, in practice, created the problem of coerced confessions. Interrogation fled from the privilege, but it did not die, and in its more bestial form extracted from generations of suspects many confessions that mere compelled testimony would never have produced.
Modem defenders of the privilige have recognized the failure of its traditional rationales, and have struggled to devise a convincing replacement. In his study of the privilege, for example, Dean Griswold concluded that, although a "good many efforts have been made to rationalize the privilege, to explain why it is a desirable or essential part of our basic law [,] . . . [n]one of the explanations is wholly satisfactory. ' 64 Dean Griswold's own justification for the privilege, however, turns out to be a quick recitation, without improvement, of the arguments Bentham justly scorned, such as the argument from self-evidence, the "old woman's reason," and the "association with unpopular institutions." 6 5 Dean Griswold adds that the privilege might protect the innocent as well as the guilty, 6 6 a claim that followed by seventeen years a critic's challenge to show one case in which the privilege protected an innocent person.
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Dean Griswold did not acknowledge the previous challenge, but he did offer hypothetical cases in which the privilege, as a revolution or an earthquake, might protect the innocent. His argument did not confront the previous demand for an actual case; but, after a powerful response along the same lines, he withdrew his defense of the privilege based on the protection of the innocent. 68 64 E. GRISWOLD, supra note 50, at 7. 65 Id. at 7-9 (alleging that self-incrimination is cruel; that the privilege is self-evidently good; and that the privilege prevents persecution based on political or religious beliefs).
66 Id. at 9-14. 200, 204 (1938) ("Let the most ardent advocate of constitutional privilege to the criminal point out a single case in all the annals of American jurisprudence where an innocent man has been, or could have been, convicted because compelled to answer questions about the crime of which he was accused."). Forty-nine years before Dean Griswold's book appeared, another critic asserted that "I have never known or heard of a case where an innocent person suffered any disadvantage from [taking the stand]. It stands to reason. The truth is consistent with itself, and everyone who is speaking the truth can tell in the main a straight story." Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE LJ. 127 (1906) . It is illuminating that after five decades no such case could be found; and, even more illuminating is the fact that, in spite of this, the best defense that could be offered for the privilege at a time of crisis was the appeal to the protection of the innocent. Indeed, I entertain little doubt that the privilege has caused the convictions of more innocent persons than it has prevented. One may hypothesize cases in which an innocent person might benefit by withholding apparently incriminating evidence for which some unlikely innocent explanation turns out to be true. 69 But, are there any who could not escape conviction by providing a complete account, incriminating and exculpatory evidence together? 70 Against the purely hypothetical risk to the innocent that the privilege combats, its availability to nonparty witnesses often denies substantial exculpatory testimony to the defense. 7 1 Although this may not be so frequent or so dangerous as to justify defense witness immunity, 72 there are real cases in which the privilege denies exculpatory evidence to the accused, 73 and no real cases in which the privilege protects an innocent defendant. The one powerful argument for the privilege maintains that, without it, the government would be able to harass its foes with beinnocent by hypothesis, any exclusionary rule might protect the innocent); Griswold, The Right To Be Left Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216, 223 (1960) (privilege is not justified by protection of the innocent but by right of privacy). At some point, one is entitled to wonder how many bad arguments for the privilege must be taken seriously before it becomes fair to conclude, pending some startling innovation, that the privilege is simply a mistake. 
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See S. HooK, supra note 68, at 54. 71 As Judge Friendly asserts: In contrast to the rare case where it may protect an innocent person, it often may do the contrary. A man in suspicious circumstances but not in fact guilty is deprived of official interrogation of another whom he knows to be the true culprit; if the former is brought to trial, the best he can do is call the latter as a witness and hope the jury will draw the inference from the witness' assertion of the privilege which the jury cannot be told it may do with respect to his own. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 680-81 (1974) . Judge Friendly offered as an example In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which extended the privilege to state juvenile court proceedings. Gault was accused of making an obscene telephone call but alleged that he had dialed the telephone and then handed it to a companion who made the obscene comments. The extension of the privilege to juvenile court proceedings prevents a suspect in Gault's position from summoning and questioning the allegedly guilty party. The frequency with which demands for defense witness immunity are raised and rejected suggests that the problem is not exotic. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1980 73 See, e.g, United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978 ), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979 . In Herman, one defendant was a magistrate charged with taking kickbacks from a bail bond agency as consideration for improperly dismissing certain cases. The defense attempted to call court employees as witnesses who allegedly would have testified that they had not shared with the magistrate the kickbacks given to them by the bail bond agency. Rather than so testify, the court employees interposed a claim of privilege, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to order immunity. lief probes and fishing expeditions. A first amendment privilege for political and religious beliefs, however, would adequately prevent the first evilJ 4 A fourth amendment right not to respond to compulsory official inquiries unless a court determines that reasonable grounds exist to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person summoned has evidence regarding it would adequately respond to the second. Other arguments for the privilege, as Bentham foresaw, are implausible. 7 6 Invocation of our adversary system, in which "the gov- SociETY 75-76 (1967) ("the argument for the privilege against self-incrimination as a protection of First Amendment freedoms is diminishing in significance. It is my belief that the proper place for devising solutions to abuses of freedom of speech and association is the amendment which is primarily intended to protect against them.").
75 See Dolinko, supra note 61, at 1081-84; McNaughton, supra note 74, at 146-47. The barrier to such an approach is United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1973) , in which the Court held that a grand jury subpoena is not a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Yet both arrest and subpoena amount to the threat of legal violence to compel attendance at ajudicial proceeding. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906) (subpoena duces tecum is a seizure). Surely as a fourth amendment matter, the Supreme Court could hold that, before a witness must respond to official inquiries under threat of institutional violence, there must be reasonable suspicion that a crime has taken place and that the witness has evidence of the crime. The police may not do more, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and it seems anomolous to allow a prosecutor to command the police to do what they are not permitted to do themselves. See In re Kelly, 433 A.2d 704 (D.C. 1981)(en banc)(court invokes supervisory power to require reasonable suspicion before admitting fruits of identification procedure in which defendant's presence was secured by subpoena rather than arrest).
76 Others have reached similar conclusions. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 74, at 61 (privilege is "a doctrine in search of a reason"); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 214 ("Honesty demands recognition that many of these reasons, faithfully and solemnly repeated year after year, are nothing but pretentious nonsense."). Most recently, David Dolinko, in an exhaustive article, analyzed the privilege with more sympathy than it deserves, but he nonetheless concludes that it has no accessible justification. See Dolinko, supra note 60.
77 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted). 78 There is nothing dispositive about the adversary or the inquisitorial label. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 74, at 70 ("Our system of civil procedure is adversary," but that has not barred the introduction of discovery procedures designed to aid in the difficult job of ascertaiing the truth.");J. Grano, supra note 3, at 6 ("It is inquisitorial to require the defendant to stand in a lineup, to yield his blood for testing, to provide handwriting samples, and to provide pretrial discovery of an intended trial defense to the prosecutor. Certainly the investigative grand jury is an inquisitorial institution ....
[O]ur system contains both accusatorial and inquisitorial characteristics.") (footnotes omitted). Bentham called the argument based on the government's duty to "shoulder the whole load" the "fox hunter's reason," according to which "[t]he fox is to have a fair chance for his defeat bad laws is misdirected unless, as seems unlikely, the evil of crime varies with its susceptibility to discovery through interrogation. 7 9 Thought crimes can be investigated only through interrogation, but so too can many homicides. Claims about the self-evident value of autonomy are inconsistent with the unavailability of the privilege when the witness must incriminate dear ones or reveal ruinous noncriminal facts. It seems also to ignore that crime victims are individuals too; putting one citizen in a state of psychic tension to protect another against homicide or rape is the only defensible value judgment when circumstance forces the choice. In short, the privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional mistake. There is a difference between compelled testimony and a coerced confession. At the threshhold, it is useful to recall that the Court's antipathy toward confessions had not, until Miranda, drawn any energy from the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 0 Until its life: he must have (so dose is the analogy) what is called law: leave to run a certain length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape." J. BENTHAM, supra note 47, at 238-39 (emphasis in original).
79 Bentham stated that the privilege might be justified if the aggregate body of the laws were so constituted, that the mischief resulting from such as are mischievous, outweighs, upon the whole, the good resulting from such as are of a beneficial character. But ... the supposition ... seems altogether improbable: for, on this supposition, a state of anarchy would be less mischievous than, would be preferrable to, such a state of government. Today, it might be asked whether, taking modem experience on the whole, the evasion of criminal responsibility by the securities manipulators of the 1930's, the leftists of the 1950's, the figures in the political scandals of the 1970's and 1980's, and the gangsters, price fixers, drug dealers, and tax cheats known to every decade, has made a positive or a negative contribution to society. 80 The coerced confession cases are the progeny of Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) . In Brown, the state relied on Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) , but the Court held that "the question of the right of the State to withdraw the privilege against self-incrimination is not here involved ....
Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different matter." 297 U.S. at 285. None of the subsequent cases invoked the fifth amendment as authority. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Malinski v. New York, the question is not whether... [the defendant] by means of a confession was forced to self-incrimination in defiance of the Fifth Amendment. The exact question is whether the criminal proceedings which resulted in his conviction deprived him of the due process of law by which he was constitutionally entitled to have his guilt determined." 324 U.S. 401, 416 (1945) The Court set out on the course of one who desires neither to tolerate abuse nor forgo the utility of confessions. Unfortunately, the Court described the constitutional test as an inquiry into voluntariness, although, in practice, the test turned on police methods and not on the suspect's autonomy. 8 5 As previously pointed out, the test could not turn on the suspect's autonomy if it were to permit the use of confessions on any significant basis. The holdings of the old voluntariness cases reflect the judgment that evidence is more important than the personal autonomy of suspects, but not as important as the prevention of abusive police tactics.
Is this a defensible ranking of the competing values? I have argued that the privilege is a mistake; that the need for evidence justifies compelling suspects to talk. Excluding notions of individual lege with the common law confessions rule, which was to become the due process voluntariness rule, the Brain Court did not explain whether the privilege placed limits stricter than or identical with those imposed on custodial interrogation by the confessions rule. As far as I am aware, the Court did not suppress a confession in a federal case on fifth amendment grounds under circumstances that would not have caused its suppression on due process grounds as well in the years between the Bram and Miranda decisions. 81 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Not until Malloy did the Court retroactively identify the confessions cases as self-incrimination cases, holding in the process that the fifth amendment applies to the states, which is a conclusion that, according to the argument, is necessary for the premise. It is little wonder that this "might have seemed to some a shotgun wedding of the privilege to the confessions rule." Herman, supra note 230, at 465 (footnote omitted autonomy, then, what is wrong with a little torture to extract the evidence? If confessions may not, except in rare cases, be voluntarily obtained, and if evidence is more important than autonomy, why tarry over how the evidence is obtained? Because, again with Bentham, we condemn suffering that is gratuitous. 8 6 If summons, contempt, and cross-examination effectively protect the relevant values, every iota of additional suffering spent for the same end is wrong. Torture, moreover, is a special problem for utilitarianism because it represents an especially attractive case for rejecting utilitarianism's "failure to take seriously the distinction among persons." 87 A slight benefit to all from the total suffering of one is the nightmare, corner solution challenge intuition offers Bentham, and, while he might not have shrunk from it, we certainly will 8 8 and should, so long as less dreadful methods might secure the same return. 86 "[AIlthough it has been too frequently forgotten, . . the delinquent is a member of the community, as well as any other individual... and... there is just as much reason for consulting his interest as any other. His welfare is proportionately the welfare of the community-his suffering the suffering of the community." I J. BENTHAM, WORKS 398 (1843).
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 5, at 27 (1971). Rawls objects to utilitarianism primarily because utilitarianism tolerates, indeed celebrates, a net increase in benefits
even if the increase accrues to the wealthiest at the expense of the poorest. Id. The objection is far more compelling in the interrogation context, in which one person might be put in complete agony, rather than simply denied some benefit in exchange for a slight enhancement of the personal security enjoyed by all other individuals in the community.
88 Bentham was not of one mind on the proscription of torture. In a paper published only recently, he suggested that, in rare instances, torture might be the lesser of two evils, and proposed a system of strict regulation for its lawful employment. See Twining 
1973
). Yet, Bentham did not publish the essay and concluded it with the statement that "[i]t is with a trembling hand I enter upon this difficult and invidious task." Id. at 54. Bentham relied on a hypothetical involving two arsonists, one of whom is captured, but refuses to turn on his accomplice. Bentham also stressed that the threat of torture might often suffice in such a situation, thus minimizing the actual suffering required. Today, more compelling hypotheticals may be devised. Nonetheless, I doubt the law's ability to cabin institutional torture within the bounds of its hypothetical justification. At any rate, the problem is a serious one, and no one justly may accuse Bentham of sadism; his agitations played an important role in restricting the death penalty, as well as moderating other forms of punishment and produced the first statutory proscription of cruelty to animals. See C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAw REFORMERS 232-33 (1923) .
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The strongest case for lawful torture is a paradox: suppose the prisoner has information relating to a gang of sadists that tortures innocents to death. In such a case, I have grave doubts that the absolutist position may be defended even in categorical terms. In utilitarian terms, the case against official torture depends on skepticism about the extent of the need for torture on the one hand and the difficulty of limiting torture to cases of genuine necessity on the other. Consider, for example, Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App.), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1982) . The brother of a kidnap victim delivered the ransom to one of the kidnappers, a confrontation ensued, and the kidnapper drew a gun. Police then arrested the kidnapper, and, [Vol. 78 SUPREME COURT REVIEW A defendant in a civil case, even a serious one threatening social and financial ruin, must answer any otherwise lawful question. But the manner of asking such questions is regulated by law and is not left to the police. No one suggests a privilege against testifying contrary to interest in civil cases. Neither does anyone urge a system in which a doctor charged with malpractice could refuse to answer questions in court but in which the court would receive in evidence a statement obtained after agents of the plaintiff kidnapped the defendant, held her in a secret safehouse for a week or two and questioned her without relent. Tacking Miranda onto such a systemwarning the kidnapped doctor that she need not answer and that she may consult a lawyer before further questioning-sounds like comedy. But comedy often has a tragic point.
The problem is not with adding Miranda; the doctor is in a dangerous environment and will be better protected with counsel than without. The problem is the need to kidnap the doctor to obtain her evidence in the first place. My example is bizarre, but it illustrates how the privilege against self-incrimination injures the system. If honored in spirit as well as form, the privilege defeats the search for truth in an extremely serious way. If honored in form only, the privilege invites coercion by driving the search for truth underground.
But if the voluntariness cases ranked the relevant values in their proper order, they also placed too much emphasis on factual conclusions govemed by police testimony and erroneously described the key concern as freedom of the will rather than police abuse. The Miranda Court saw the privilege as a solution to the defects of the 410 So. 2d at 202. The government did not attempt to introduce the statements so obtained at the trial; the issue on appeal was whether a subsequent confession was voluntary given the prior violence. The court, over a strong dissent, held that the confession was properly admitted. But, were the officers wrong to forcibly extract the location of the kidnap victim? I think the answer is no, they were not, and that if they were sued on a constitutional theory they should be allowed a defense of compelling state interest. But accepting a system of official torture is a different matter. Legitimated torture would tend to exceed whatever bounds initially confined it and would pose too great a risk of political repression. Given that torture, even in a single transaction and considered in purely utilitarian terms, could be justified only when human life is in danger and might realistically be saved, the proscription of official torture should be absolute. If one of the nightmare hypotheticals ever comes to pass, the officials confronted with the dilemma should know that, if they turn out to be right, they will have a defense but that they act at their peril.
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due process approach. The substitution of a rule actually, for one only nominally, based on autonomy, given enforcement, would indeed prevent police abuse. But it would also prevent confessions to the same extent that autonomy and confession are incompatible, namely, almost completely.
Miranda's fundamental doctrinal failure, then, is the confusion of police abuse with violations of the privilege against self-incrimination. If the privilege has chased violence and trickery from the courthouse to the police station, then the privilege will pursue the violence and trickery. From the station, violence and trickery must flee either to rampant perjury or to the elicitation of waivers.
The Miranda majority never explained how a suspect could make a "knowing and intelligent waiver" while under the influence of the same inherently compelling environment that justified the warnings. 90 The available evidence, as one might suspect, suggests that coercion now focuses upon the obtaining of waivers. 1 (1967) . The New Haven and District of Columbia studies found that the warnings had little effect; in Pittsburgh, the confession rate, but not the conviction rate, declined significantly. Additional data are canvassed by White, supra note 38, at 19 n.99. Professor White concludes: "The great weight of empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact on the police's ability to obtain confessions has not been significant." Id. See also Frankel, supra note 16, at 528-29 ("multitudes of waivers are found to have occurred each year, despite the fact that any person who knows what he is doing ought to volunteer nothing")(footnote omitted)). The Justice Department's Report on Pre-Trial Interrogation, supra note 4, has not shaken the conclusion that Miranda has not greatly impeded law enforcement. Besides the Pittsburgh study, the Report relies primarily on beforeand-after comparisons of confession rates compiled by three prosecutors: Arlen Specter, Aaron Koota, and Frank Hogan. Sess. 201, 223, 1121 Sess. 201, 223, (1967 [hereinafter Hearings] . Police unfamiliarity with the new rules is the most likely explanation for the difference between the bulk of empirical data and the immediate before-and-after comparisons. As now-Senator Specter stated recently, "'Whatever the preliminary indications were 20 years ago, I am now satisfied that law enforcement has become accommodated to Miranda, and therefore I see no reason to turn back the clock.' " Kamisar, Landmark Rulings Had No Detrimental Effect, Boston Sunday Globe, Feb. 1, 1987 A27 (Focus Section)(quoting Arlen Specter). There are other defects with the before-warnings, in this respect, have failed, and I know of only a few extreme critics of police interrogation who want them to work. 9 2 If every suspect in America took the warnings seriously and immediately invoked the right to counsel, the horde of criminals hitherto confined to the rhetoric of right wing ideologues would indeed be loosed upon us. From Brown to Miranda to Connelly and Spring, the Court has groped its way toward a legal regime that permits the extraction of confessions but forbids doing so with needless brutality. The privilege against self-incrimination is the chief legal obstacle to achieving such an accommodation. For the privilege means that what interrogation there is must be conducted by the police. So long as the police conduct interrogation, judicial inquiries into actual coercion will prove inadequate to secure the goal of preventing needless brutality. If the courts follow Miranda to its logical conclusion and enforce the privilege fully in the interrogation context, then autonomy will prevail over the need for evidence.
Questions must be asked, but they could be asked by people other than the police, in a public place, under rules of law. We have to live with constitutional mistakes, but, if there is an interpretation of the Constitution that would permit such an arrangement, the Court ought not to overlook it. I turn now to the search for such an interpretation.
V. THE MATTER OF LAW

A.
CAN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRIVILEGE AND THE NEED FOR
EVIDENCE BE AVOIDED THROUGH INTERPRETATION?
The Constitution does guarantee the privilege against self-incrimination. Those who believe that constitutions have the function less of advising than of governing political behavior may not ignore and-after comparisons. The Hogan data were based on the number of confessions introduced before the grand jury, a procedural phase that comes after arrest and arraignment. Hearings, supra, at 1121. The Hogan data, therefore, probably include many cases in which the arrest and interrogation took place before Miranda, so that any statement obtained without the warnings would not be used before the grand jury. All three before-and-after comparisons measure only the frequency of any statement by the suspect, not the frequency of statements by guilty suspects useful in establishing guilt. None of the comparisons demonstrated any effect on the conviction rate, much less the crime rate. Mr. Koota's own statment expressly admitted that the "decisions of the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, Miranda, Escobedo and others, have not caused an increase in the crime rate." Id. at 226. Indeed, Mr. Koota concurred with the observation of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach that the idea that the Court's rulings had increased the crime rate was "unutterable nonsense." Id.
92 See, e.g., Ogeltree, supra, note 3, at 1842-45 (advocating a non-waivable right to counsel during interrogation).
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this plain provision of our fundamental positive law. If we are to have fundamental law, we may not pick and choose which of its provisions we are willing to obey. This concern, I believe, excludes Wigmore's idea of construing the privilege to death because we think its basic policy is mistaken.
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Grudging constitutionalism eventually will yield to the temptations inspiring it and will altogether nullify the constitutional command. From the fifth amendment, we need to look no further than the present status of the fourth for proof of Wigmore's error. 9 4 If an interpretation of the privilege were available that allowed humane interrogation for some reason independent of any extrinsic conclusion that the privilege is a mistake, then the extrinsic conclusion might justify selecting that interpretation over another which is equally plausible but more expansive. What we are looking for is an interpretation of the Constitution that allows interrogation but that does not depend on rejecting constitutional value judgments.
For more than a century, the courts have tolerated police interrogation as a way of circumventing the privilege against self-incrimination. Stated so openly, is there any question that, fairly read to secure its objects, the fifth amendment forbids police interrogation for evidentiary purposes?
The privilege cannot be confined to judicial proceedings; the constitutional language, 95 history, 9 6 and policy, 9 7 as well as nearly a 93 See IIIJ. WIGMORE, supra note 46, at 3102 ("The privilege therefore should be kept within limits the strictest possible. So much of it lies in the interpretation that its scope will be greatly affected by the spirit in which that interpretation is approached.").
94 See, e.g., Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 947-48 (1986) ; LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983) ; Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984) .
95 The fifth amendment provides that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[J" U.S. CONST. Amend. V. If being "a witness" is limited to taking the stand, then the privilege would not forbid the compulsion of statements outside the courtroom. But, the sixth amendment's confrontation clause provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. If an out-ofcourt declarant were not a "witness," this provision would be meaningless. If "witness" means the same thing in both provisions, and there is no reason for thinking otherwise, then the fifth amendment forbids using compelled pretrial statements as evidence of guilt.
96 In 1791, the common law rule held the defendant incompetent, due to interest, to testify at trial. See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1930) . It follows that the privilege applies to the use at trial of out-of-court statements, for in no other way could the accused be made a witness against himself. See KAMISAR, supra note 34, at 49-55.
97 Professor Satzburg acutely points out:
The honest question that is never addressed by the Miranda dissenters is the follow-century of Supreme Court precedents, 98 all support the application of the privilege to statements obtained outside the courtroom. Typical police interrogation surely constitutes compulsion in any sense of that word. 9 9 If, as the Supreme Court has held, it is accepted that comment on the failure to take the stand' 0 0 or the denial of public employment 10 ' constitute forbidden compulsion, the contrary proposition borders on frivolity.
1 0 2
If the privilege applies to police interrogation and interrogation involves compulsion in the great majority of cases, then the use at trial of interrogation's fruits in the great majority of cases is unconing one: If the drafters of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination intended that, as long as the possibility of incrimination in a criminal case exists, no magistrate, judge or court of the United States could compel a person to answer questions even though the person is given a lawyer, the proceedings are public and recorded and scrupulously fair-could they possibly have intended to permit other officials (police and prosecutors) to compel the same answers in secret sessions, most often unrecorded, without the suspect having counsel, and with no judicial protection against the nature and manner of questioning? Such an honest question deserves an honest answer, the answer is Miranda. Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 14-15. See also KamisAR, supra note 34, at 45-46 ("Given Counselman v. Hitchcock and McCarthy v. Arndstein, Miranda appears to be an a fortiori case; that is, unless one is prepared to rekindle the Twining-Adamson-Malloy debate.... Assuming a 'first amendment privilege' which would relieve the fifth amendment of its burden in 'belief probes,' most, if not all, that can be said for the privilege applies in spades to police interrogation.")(footnotes omitted)); McNaughton, supra note 74, at 151-52 ("Both policies of the privilege which I accept, as well as most of those which I reject, apply with full force to insure that police in informal interrogations not have the right to compel self-incriminatory answers."). 99 As Kamisar states: Dwell for a moment on the reasoning that because police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is nothing to counteract, there is no legal obligation to which a privilege can apply, and hence the police can elicit statements from suspects who are likely to assume or be led to believe that there are legal (or extralegal) sanctions for contumacy. Is it unduly harsh to say, as those who do not use strong words lightly have, that such reasoning is "casuistic"--"a quibble"? KAmISAR, supra note 34, at 46 (footnotes omitted) (quotingJudge Traynor and Professor McNaughton). The aspects of police interrogation discussed supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text suggest an affirmative answer to Professor Kamisar's question. See also infra note 105.
100 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 101 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). 102 In an attempt to deny the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, the Department of Justice Report offered as an example the questioning of Senator Edward Kennedy following the Chappaquiddick incident. See Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation, supra note 4, at 46. If this does not border on frivolity, then the defenders of Miranda might, with straight faces, concede the desirability of a "senatorial exception" to the Miranda rules.
stitutional. Miranda squarely holds as much. 0 3 On reason and authority, then, the fifth amendment appears to prohibit the use at trial of any statement secured through custodial interrogation.
Miranda, I believe, is vulnerable, but only with respect to its further holding that the warnings and the offer of counsel dispel the otherwise unconstitutional compulsion of custodial interrogation.104 The same pressures that "compel" the suspect to become 103 384 U.S. at 461.
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion [described in the police manuals] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court "concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 467.
104 There can be little quarrel with the necessity, as opposed to the sufficiency, of the warning and offer of counsel. As Professors Bator and Vorenberg wrote, at a time when they were described as figures in "an interlocking directorate of criminal law institutes with a decided Harvard flavor and a plan to preserve the police's authority to interrogate," F. GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICTED WOUND 173 (1970)(emphasis added), "for reasons too obvious to explore at length, [warning the suspect] is absolutely essential. Certainly the minimum condition for the exercise of autonomous choice is to tell the suspect that he has a choice, that there is no legal obligation to talk." Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 31 at 71. Since administrative practice before grand juries typically includes a warning, the Supreme Court has not yet had to decide whether a warning is constitutionally required. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582 n.7 (1976)(plurality opinion). The Mandujano plurality cogently points out, however, that police interrogation is more compelling than are grand jury proceedings, and, accordingly, stronger safeguards are appropriate in the police interrogation context. Id. at 579-80. Moreover, a grand jury witness has time before appearing to consult with counsel, who might advise the witness of the privilege's availability. Miranda's offer of counsel is consistent with the Court's other self-incrimination cases. Counsel, of course, is available at trial. The witness summoned to testify before a grand jury has the option of consulting counsel before any questioning. The Court also has held that the fifth amendment requires the availability of counsel before the privilege holder must comply with a contempt order compelling the production of evidence in a civil case. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) . In Maness, a state trial court ordered production of documents believed by their custodian, but not the court, to be privileged. The court, in an order reviewable only by taking a contempt citation, ordered production, and the custodian's attorney advised him not to comply with the order. The court held the attorney in contempt as well, and the Supreme Court reversed the contempt sanction against the lawyer. Since the underlying litigation was civil in character, the privilege holder had no sixth amendment right to counsel. Instead, the fifth amendment of its own force required the procedural safeguard of legal advice.
The privilege against compelled self-incrimination would be drained of its meaning if counsel, being lawfully present, as here, could be penalized for advising his client in good faith to assert it. The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights, often depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and skilled in "a witness against himself" bear equally on the decision to take advantage of the warning. 10 5 The same secrecy that clouds the inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession obscures the inquiry into the effectiveness of a fifth amendment waiver.' 0 6 For these reasons, strong advocates of police interrogation concede that, if Miranda's legal underpinnings are, as I think they fairly clearly are, correct, then any evidentiary use of interrogation's fruits, even when warnings were given, is per se unconstitutional.1 0 7 If hypocrisy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue, Miranda is the compliment that the public interest pays to the fifth amendment.
The Court's efforts to enforce the fifth amendment necessarily entail a morally unjustifiable loss of evidence, while its efforts to preserve police interrogation because of its evidentiary value necessarily entail a legally unjustifiable derogation of the constitutional the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. A layman may not be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege. It is not a self-executing mechanism; it can be affirmatively waived, or lost by not asserting it in a timely fashion. Id. at 465-66 (footnotes omitted). As with grand juries and Miranda the Mannes Court recognized that the option of consulting counsel is essential to the enforcement of the fifth amendment right. To be distinguished from all overt confrontations between a suspect and state agents are situations in which the government secretly records or observes statements that evidence a crime, as in cases of undercover agents and electronic surveillance. In such situations, there is no compulsion, because the state action is not the but for cause of the suspect's statement, only of its discovery. In these situations, the suspect would have made similar statements even in the absence of the microphone or government agent. A person's innermost thoughts may be committed to writing in a diary; but, if the diary is seized consistently with the fourth amendment, its recitation of incriminating statements does not implicate the fifth amendment, because the declarant is not the conduit of the information. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (subpoena directing attorney to produce documents that incriminate client does not offend client's privilege against self-incrimination). Of course, as the government's presence becomes more overt, difficult lines must be drawn, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) , since state action that is the but for cause of a statement is not necessarily unlawful compulsion. But, this does not undermine the gross distinction between listening to a person talk and causing a person to talk, the distinction that separates mere surveillance from interrogation. 129-37 (6th ed. 1986) .
107 See Grano, supra note 8, at 689 ("with unexacting waiver requirements .... professional interrogation can coexist with a right of counsel, but only intellectual dishonesty can make such coexistence theoretically compatible."); Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants: Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 235 (1966) decision to include the privilege in our fundamental law. Miranda does no more (indeed, it does significantly less) than take the fifth amendment seriously. Every argument against Miranda applies with greater strength to the privilege in general. In any situation, some factual difference can be converted into a distinction, with antipathy to the privilege as a policy justification. But each such limitation is subversive of constitutional law, for each elevates a conceded contemporary policy preference over a conceded constitutional value judgment.
Forced to choose between the loss of some evidence and admitting a judicial power to nullify constitutional rights I consider extravagant, I would elect to surrender the evidence rather than the enforcement of constitutional rights. This conclusion supports stronger, not weaker, restrictions on police interrogation, pending some change in the constitutional status of the privilege. In part, this conclusion reflects the belief that a few more criminals, one way or the other, is not a prize worth a wager of constitutionalism. But it also reflects the belief that, to a greater degree than is widely supposed, a change in the constitutional status of the privilege could be achieved by the Supreme Court through a principled exercise in constitutional interpretation.
B. DOES THE CONSTITUTION MAKE THE PRIVILEGE
A NECESSARY EVIL?
The fifth amendment plainly imposes the privilege on the federal government. The privilege, however, is binding on the states, not by an express constitutional command, but by judicial decision. In Malloy v. Hogan,1 0 8 the Court, overruling Twining v. New Jersey 1 0 9 and Adamson v. California 11 0 and casting aside dicta from Palko v. Connecticut, "11 held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause incorporates the privilege against self-incrimination. This conclusion is not essential to constitutionalism; if the predicate for incorporation is fundamental fairness, reasons to regard the privilege as no more than a windfall to lucky criminals provide a principled basis for rejecting incorporation. Surely the case against the privilege at least takes it out of the category of those rights that constitute "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." 1 12 Among the great 108 378 U.S. 1 (1964 In addition to these justices, the great lower court judges of the last generation either forthrightly denied, or remained studiously agnostic about, the ultimate value of the privilege. See W. ScHAE-FER, supra note 74, at 59-76; Friendly, supra note 71; Traynor, supra note 10, at 674-75.
114 378 U.S. at 9-10. Indeed, counsel for the state argued that the voluntariness doctrine really rested on the privilege against self-incrimination as support for the incorporation of the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 10 n.8. 115 See supra note 80. 116 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8-9. In Mapp v. Ohio, 369 U.S. 643 (1961) , the Court extended the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states; Justice Black provided the fifth vote for the Mapp holding. InJustice Black's view, the exclusionary rule is a corollary of the privilege against self-incrimination, because the privilege entitles the victim of an illegal search to refuse to come forward with evidence of crime. But basing the fourth amendment exclusionary rule on the fifth amendment fails to account for the limitation of the privilege to testimonial evidence, or for the government's right to introduce even testimonial evidence so long as the defendant is not the conduit of the information. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1971) sions in the Bill of Rights providing for grand jury presentment and civil jury trial.' l9 The Court openly picks and chooses based on a sense of natural justice, and, by that standard, the privilege ought to be disincorporated. This would free the states to develop humane systems of in-court interrogation and would simultaneously enable the Court to tighten restrictions on police interrogation. The states might retain their own versions of the privilege. State constitutions, however, are easier to change than is their federal counterpart, and developments such as California's adoption of proposition eight suggest that the political will exists to reform state constitutions.
Some states might decide upon one or another of the various proposals for preliminary judicial examination of the accused. 120 But retention of the privilege would convert such proposals into the effective abolition of interrogation. A suspect, warned of his right to silence, advised by counsel, and protected by a magistrate from police bullying, will not confess. Every step in the direction of making the suspect confess, whether by dispensing with counsel, warnings, or by threatening to comment on the refusal to make a statement, is a form of compulsion at war with the privilege.
12 '
These proposals accept the logic of nullifying the privilege, without countenancing police interrogation. To the extent such proposals would not succeed in nullifying the privilege, important and humanely obtainable evidence would be forgone, and a corrresponding incentive would exist to circumvent the privilege by admitting the fruits of out-of-court interrogation. If preliminary examination would nullify the privilege, I do not see the point of keeping the privilege on the books. This is not to say that preliminary judicial examination would not be far superior to police interrogation. 1 2 2 But, I would prefer a system of preliminary examination, backed by the trial court's right to consider refusals to answer and, perhaps, with a contempt sanction enforceable by a differentjudge. At trial, the defendant should be subject to compulsory process like any other witness and subject to impeachment with his prior statement or prior silence. This would secure, without brutality, a far greater quantity of probative evidence and would also provide the police with a strong incentive to comply with prompt presentment requirements.
Although the states might move in the direction I suggest, the Court could virtually ensure such progress by imposing stricter constitutional limits on police interrogation. Accordingly, I propose that statements obtained by the police from persons under arrest be made inadmissible, whether for impeachment or otherwise, at any subsequent trial. At least three constitutional avenues are open to such a rule.
First, the Supreme Court might impose this exclusionary rule as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process. Independently of the privilege against self-incrimination, due process forbids extracting confessions with third degree methods. 123 Surely the level of police cruelty has declined, but, just as surely, enough remains to justify constitutional scrutiny. Even in this relatively enlightened era, members of the nation's largest police force allegedly have interrogated petty criminals with the aid of an electric stun gun. 125 See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, supra note 62, at 48 ("It is conservative to say that for every one of the cases which do by a long chance find a place in the official reports there are many hundreds, and probably thousands, of instances of the use of third degree in one form or another.") (quoting A.B.A. Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law) (footnote omitted). By now, the multiplier is proba-was decided, case-by-case adjudication cannot provide an effective remedy. An effective prophylactic against police coercion, therefore, would be at least as justifiable as Miranda's prophylactic approach to the prevention of compelled testimony. 26 Second, the Court could revive Escobedo and extend the right to counsel to the time of arrest. This could be coupled with rejection of any waiver that allegedly takes place before the suspect actually consults with an attorney. Many judges and commentators have advocated the first extension, 1 2 7 and the New York courts have moved bly lower, but it must remain substantial. For official reports of police cruelty, see 585 (1978) (defendant struck and tripped while handcuffed). Far more common are "swearing contests" in which the court chooses between the accounts of the police and the accused. White, supra note 38, at 12 n.67. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 114 Ill. 2d 450, 501 N.E.2d 123 (1986) (defendant who required surgery for crushed trachea resulting from "blunt trauma" failed to prove that injury took place while in the custody of the Chicago police; confession admitted).
126 Indeed, the legitimacy objection to Miranda is directed against the Court's positive prescription of warnings and counsel, rather than against its negative pronouncement that police interrogation as previously conducted violated the fifth amendment. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 453-55. In requiring warnings and the offer of counsel, the Court did not so much promulgate legislative rules as declare through judicial dicta a prospective unwillingness to admit confessions in future cases unless certain procedures are followed. The political branches may, of course, elect to interrogate without warnings, but the courts will hold statements so obtained inadmissible. More generally, prophylactic constitutional rules-rules that forbid constitutional state conduct that is practically indistinguishable from unconstitutional state conduct-are recognized and uncontroversial in many areas other than confessions. An example of a prophylactic rule that protects fourteenth amendment due process is the requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness before the state may commit a mental patient. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) . This rule prevents the states from committing some individuals who are in fact dangerous; any less stringent rule would permit the states to commit many persons who are not dangerous. Although this approach is controversial, see Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985) ; Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 REV. (1978 , the alternative is tolerance of state action that does not demonstrably violate constitutional rights. Since most violations of constitutional rights can not be demonstrated with anything approaching certainty, the argument against prophylactic rules depends on thejudgment that it is better to tolerate unconstitutional state action than to prevent constitutional state action. The Court always has repudiated this judgment. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (the Court has "no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."). For further discussion, see Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. -, -n. 113 (1987) (forthcoming). Hostility to prophylactic rules often varies with the particular rule under consideration. For example, Professor Caplan, a leading defender of police interrogation, urges a constitutional prophylactic rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was obtained voluntarily to enforce the due process voluntariness test. See Caplan, supra note 3, at 1473.
127 In a pronouncement later rendered inoperative by Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
[Vol. 78 SUPREME COURT REVIEW in the direction of the second. 128 With the demise of a constitutional privilege, the Court could take both steps at once. 129 Third, the Court could constitutionalize, on fourth amendment grounds, the old McNabb-Mallory rule.1 3 0 Interrogation typically requires more time than it takes to simply bring the arrested person before a judge for commitment. In theory, arrest has no purpose other than enabling presentment to a judge, but, in practice, it is often used for investigative interrogation. The Court could hold any statement obtained during a period of unnecessary delay before presentment the fruit of an unreasonable detention which is, therefore, inadmissible. Indeed, the chief obstacle to constitutionalizing the McNabb-Mallowy rule is the need for confessions.' 3 1 It follows that, with the demise of the privilege, this approach could contribute significantly to the elimination of police interrogation.1 3 2
Under any of these approaches, the states could be counted on to respond to the overruling of Malloy. Regrettably, no principled interpretation of the Constitution can enable parallel federal reforms until the fifth amendment privilege is repealed. Moreover, if the privilege, unlike the due process voluntariness test, is ultimately concerned with autonomy, then something far stronger than Miranda would be required to protect the privilege against pretrial in-terrogation by federal agents. 33 This drawback, however, is likely to prove less serious than it at first appears. Federal prosecutors are adept at employing the investigative grand jury and granting immunity to overcome the obstacles to law enforcement that the privilege poses. The outstanding record of federal agents with respect to humane interrogation, a record that goes back to the Wickersham Commission, strongly suggests that, unlike their state counterparts, federal officers have little need to extract confessions outside of court. Those federal crimes that raise the need, such as bank robbery, are punished concurrently by the states. At any rate, enforcement of unambiguous constitutional judgments simply is not an issue governed by contemporary policy preferences. If effective enforcement of the privilege at the federal level allows some criminals to go unwhipped of justice, so be it.
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as society struggles to protect itself from crime, selfincrimination will be with us. The only question is: how will society go about inducing individuals to incriminate themselves? Very few will ever do so autonomously, and none should do so in response to needlessly cruel pressures. Miranda represents a valiant judicial effort to reconcile these judgments, but, as long as obtaining confessions is seen as legitimate and even necessary, any serious restriction on police interrogation is socially unacceptable.
That leaves giving up the privilege against self-incrimination. No acute argument or memorable phrase will lead us to do thatwitness Bentham. Yet, ironically, we do not really need to be persuaded that the privilege is a mistake. The institution of police interrogation proves our practical rejection of the privilege.
Regarding the values we hold, rather than those we celebrate, that institution speaks more eloquently than any slogan, any argument.
